Religious Toleration and the Theologico-Political Problem, Pt. II

By | September 23, 2014

Editor’s note: This article is the second installment in a three-piece essay. Parts one and three can be viewed here and here, respectively.

Thus far we have watched Storck attempt to prove that Locke’s hypothetical government rests on a dichotomy between the sacred and secular. As both Reynolds and the case of the animal sacrifices show, however, natural reason is not a “closed system” that excludes from consideration supernatural truths necessary for governance.

The danger of magistrates who reason wrongly, or misconstrue what constitutes a threat to the common good, does, of course, remain. But this is present in all human governments. The difference in Locke’s model is that the government cannot penalize religious beliefs at all. And it may only penalize religious practices if they threaten the common good. Neither of these protections exists under establishments.

To better understand the compatibility of religion and politics in a Lockean polity, we must examine the philosophy behind the Letter. Locke reiterates throughout his writings that the natural law must be understood as a “Declaration” of “the Will of God” [1] or else no one has any real reason to obey it or the human laws based on it. [2] Furthermore, Locke argues that the existence of a single, omnipotent, omniscient God can be demonstrated with certainty. [3] In a Lockean regime, then, citizens and magistrates are taught that they live in a world where the natural depends on the supernatural so that moral law—and the government’s declaration of it—has real authority.

Locke’s attitude towards atheists proves this claim. Although tolerant governments cannot impose particular beliefs about God, they can penalize those who deny God’s existence, since it is so evident. Thus, the Letter maintains that governments are free to refuse toleration to atheists. [4] Indeed, Locke’s 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina state unequivocally that atheists are not to be tolerated, and many American state governments continued this practice well into the 19th century, some even to this day.

Moreover, since the Letter only forbids “Force and Compulsion” in matters of religion, magistrates in a tolerant government remain free to have “a charitable” care for religion. “Magistracy,” Locke writes, “does not oblige [anyone] to put off either Humanity or Christianity.” [5] This is an important distinction. Only the state’s official jurisdiction is confined to the natural law. In other words, magistrates may inform their arguments by consulting clergymen, Scripture, and Tradition. They may proselytize, teach Christian truth, and use Christian arguments on the floor of Congress. But laws and decisions, when promulgated, must be framed according to the dictates of natural law.

By enforcing the natural law in this way, a tolerant government encourages virtue in its citizens. Virtue is necessary for several reasons, Locke argues, among them the fact that “Lusts … hinder an impartial examination” and “real imbracing” of “the true Religion.” By subduing “Lusts … Luxury and Debauchery,” magistrates “bring Sobriety, Peaceableness, Industry and Honesty into fashion” and foster a citizenry better able to judge between churches. [6]

Locke carefully points out, however, that this emphasis on the reasonableness of God’s existence and the natural law does not mean that “natural religion” is sufficient for government. Crucially, he argues that, although unassisted reason can know God’s existence, it can’t know with certainty that there exists a future state in which we will be accountable for our actions. [7] And since God’s power in eternity is the ultimate grounding of moral authority for Locke, [8] this means that reason, apart from revelation, lacks the necessary power to establish morality on its true foundations.

The question, then, is how belief in orthodox divine revelation can best be propagated. Locke, for his part, offered several compelling arguments that freedom would accomplish this end better than coercion.

If the goal of a religious establishment is not merely to prop up the state, but to save souls, Locke asks, how can coercing men into belief of the reigning party’s orthodoxy be effective? Under this arrangement, the state (possessing temporal power) is more likely to influence the church than vice-versa, and since when have the men who excel at the art of politics been notable for their theological insights?

Furthermore, Locke makes the case that government can have no power over matters of faith because coercion cannot possibly inculcate true faith—much less saving faith. [9] In fact, he asks, isn’t it more likely to produce hypocrisy and resentment of Christianity? [10] Moreover, giving government the power to save souls would so conflate the purposes of church and state as to make the two institutions indistinguishable, to the detriment of both. [11] Lastly, revelation and reason both make clear that no person has the right or ability to “so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other.” [12] Using government force to establish a religious monopoly encourages intellectual and spiritual laziness, not only on behalf of the people, but of the clergy and government as well.

If Storck wishes to argue that force can make for more sincere and vibrant faith than freedom, he must answer each of these arguments.

[1] Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §135

[2] There are few points about which Locke is more adamant throughout his writings: “[T]he only true touchstone of moral rectitude,” he says, is “the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender,” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXVIII, §8; Ibid, Book I, Ch. III, §12

[3] Ibid, Book IV, Ch. X, §1-6; Ibid, Bk IV, Ch XXVII, §23

[4] Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 52-53. Storck wrote previously that Locke “was not necessarily concerned with the theological question of the existence of God, but simply with the instrumental value of belief as a means of promoting honesty in social conduct.” This interpretation reveals a feeble grasp of Locke’s thought. Among many other things, an entire chapter of the Essay is devoted to proving God’s existence. And as I show from the Essay (see n2, above), Locke held that the instrumental value of belief in God is a consequence of the truth of God’s existence.

[5] Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 14, 26, 46

[6] Ibid, 94-97

[7] Locke, Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 203-204

[8] Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXVIII, §8; Book I, Ch. III, §12

[9] “The Civil Magistrate’s … Power consists only in outward force: But true and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward Force.” Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 13, 31-32

[10] Ibid, 8-12; 89-91

[11] Ibid, 69-76

[12] Ibid, 13

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  • http://newarkistheplace.com Thomas Mullally

    There is an element of truth here, but the reasoning is out of date. Therefore it cannot be constructive.

    It is true that the state bureaus alone never envisioned or enabled the complete subjugation of morality and religion as we have witnessed in our lifetimes. However we need to address the problem as a confluence of giant private bureaucracies and their powers, in cooperation with (and some would say determination of) the traditional powers of the state. This development, unknown in history (since in the 1800’s the business elite were religious men), has given increased license to the state, for the subjugation of morality and religion.

    As the state and oligarchs have come to work in full coordination, addressing our oppression in terms of state power alone, is a complete anachronism.

  • Dan Hugger

    This is a really helpful piece. Liberalism is a really broad tradition and critiques of it often ignore distinctions between various strains of liberalism.

  • Stephen Peterson

    Nathan, I believe the problem with your argument is that you’re asserting a dichotomy between establishment and toleration. I don’t believe Stork argues against toleration at any point, merely for protection of the True Faith. While such an assertion might seem reasonable due to the historical links between established churches and religious intolerance, there are enough counter examples (Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, post-emancipated United Kingdom, etc.) to make this risk becoming a straw man.
    Furthermore, by confinement of your position to the Constitution of the United States, you inadvertently confine it to an assumption of Westphalia sovereignty. As scholars such as William Cavanaugh and Charles Tilly argue, the argument that the post-Westphalia state exists to protect the common good is simply rhetoric to hide the fact that the state’s principle end is the continued endurance of the state. Protecting the common good is merely a means to that end, and only when it’s convenient.
    In addition, a case can easily be made that religious persecution is more likely to be the result of sovereignty than the result of a religion i.e. the thing that all states that persecute minorities have in common is that they’re all sovereign states - the argument that it’s because they all have established churches is a misdirect.

  • http://batman-news.com Stephen Peterson

    “It is true that the state bureaus alone never envisioned nor enabled the complete subjugation of morality and religion, as we have witnessed in our lifetimes.”
    I would argue that, indeed, it was always envisioned that morality and religion be subject to the secular authorities. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) instituted the principal of cuius regio, eius religio. The Treaty of Munster (1648) stipulated that Christians living in principalities where their denomination was not the established church were guaranteed the right to practice their faith in public during allotted hours and in private at their will. All states founded since the Peace of Westphalia is based upon these principals, and the United States is no exception. The only thing that is different is that eius religio is not defined, but all other things remain.
    In other words, since the invention of the modern state, any religious liberty you’ve experienced to date has been by the grace of the state.

  • http://newarkistheplace.com Thomas Mullally

    Well, states being states, they are rarely effective in their purpose!

    I know Westphalia 1648 is the traditional division for Western Civ turning the corner so to speak, and I also find it interested to look at the influence of Calvinism in forming our current society, and blaming this theology for everything that is wrong today…. :) . But these are old battles. To turn the tide right now, we have to be attacking both sides of the equation e.g. harrassing not only the legislators and administrators but also the super-powerful corporate and personal interests who direct them.

  • http://batman-news.com Stephen Peterson

    An old battle it may be, but it is the principle of state soverignty, established by Westphalia, that still exists today, and which is the root cause of continuing problems. Harassing legislators and corporations is merely treating the symptoms - even if we succeed in gaining ground there is nothing to stop the next generation of legislators and corporations from reversing all our gains. Only by attacking the principle of state soverignty itself can we hope to acheive any permenant gains in this battle. As long as our religious freedom is by the grace of the modern state it isn’t truely freedom.

  • http://newarkistheplace.com Thomas Mullally

    OK, when you put together your organization declaring the dissolution of the US, count me in… in the meantime I am going to try and be more incremental about it… :)

  • Thaddeus

    After Murray, Maritain, Neuhaus, Weigel, et. al, Locke always wins, for the alternative, the Catholic confessional political order, is deemed simply impossible or, if possible, intrinsically unjust. And Dignitatis Humanae is brought out to back this judgment up.

    But as Patrick Brennan has shown. DH leaves the traditional teaching of the perennial ideal of the Catholic confessional state, an ideal that must be sought in any circustances by Catholics, untouched:

    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa…

    To imply, as Murray and Gill do, that this ideal must NEVER be sought, or at least never in America, is a denial of the obvious political implications of Libertas Ecclesae, that is, a denial of the Catholic Faith.

  • Thaddeus

    My books shows that after MacIntyre (as well as Rowland, Cavanaugh, Schindler, and Ferrara), one must not only see the American nation state model as intrinsically in tension with libertas ecclesiae, but the nation-state itself: http://www.amazon.com/The-Political-Problem-Religious-Pluralism/dp/073917987X?tag=donations09-20

    What is the alternative? Political orders that are permitted corporately to recognize the sacred and the divine. Such cannot exist when religious pluralism is considered normative or inescapable. Of course, the lager the scale, the more normative and inevitable it seems, but that’s because as the scale becomes larger, a politics of the common good under the social reign of Christ (not the social reign of religious liberty) becomes less possible.